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Abstract
In this article, historical background and changing nature of geopolitics will be  discussed 
from the perspective of public policy-making of national security policy in the nation state-system. 
The article will be partitioned in five sections. 
In section 1, the historical background of geopolitics will be briefly described: First, the 
Heartland theory developed by Halford Mackinder in the late 19th and early 20th century will 
be examined in the context of political geography for protecting the world-wide interest of 
the British Empire. Second, German geopolitics during the 1930’s to the early 1940’s mainly 
developed by Karl Haushofer will be depicted. Thirdly, the Sea Power theory of Admiral Alfred T. 
Mahan which had gave an great influence to American geopolitics will be discussed. Finally, the 
Rimland theory posited by Nicholas J. Spykman in contrast to Mackinder’s Heartland theory will 
be described.
In section 2, hard clash of U.S.-Soviet geopolitics around the world during the Cold War era 
will be dramatically described, especially focused on the Cold War syndrome both in the United 
States and the Soviet Union. As for the geopolitics in the U.S., the ideological basis of containment 
against Russia will be examined through the analysis of James Burnham’s geopolitical ideas. The 
Russian geopolitics will be specifically   examined by touching upon the “BrezhnevDoctrine”, on 
the other.
In Section 3, the dramatic transformation of geopolitics during the final stage of the Cold 
War and after the end of the War will be discussed by introducing new theoretical framework of 
geo-economics and geo-science & technology. The threat perception of American people against 
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Japan’s economic miracle since the late 1980’s gave rise to a sense of economic insecurity vis-
à-vis Japan as well as to new ideologies of geo-economics and geo-science & technology in the 
U. S. soil. So here, the theoretical new framework and practical phase of neo-geopolitics will be 
presented and fully discussed.  
In section 4, further transformation of geopolitics will be treated in terms of structural and 
functional change of international system, especially after the 9/11 incidents. The geopolitical 
change of international system has been complicatedly intertwined with rapidly growing power 
of such non-state actors as terrorist groups. The geo-strategic concept of the “arc of instability” 
which was officially presented by the Bush administration will be critically analyzed. In addition, 
harsh conflicts over the  natural resources, especially contest over the petroleum and natural gas 
development along the Caspian Sea will be described in terms of resource geopolitics.
In section 5, some schools of critical geopolitics against classical geopolitics like ecological 
and environmental geopolitics will be introduced and also discussed from the perspective of 
human security. Finally, a necessity to buid a new paradigm for neo-geopolitics will be suggested.
1.  Lineage of Classical Geopolitics and Application to the Theory of 
National Security
There has been a great deal written before now about the history of geopolitics which 
continues to inform the idea of policymakers responsible for making and implementing national 
security policy and diplomacy. For policymakers, protection of territorial sovereignty is the 
fundamental policy required for ensuring the survival of one’s own country within the sovereign 
state system that governs the international community. Policymakers thus mobilize the resources 
of the country towards the realization of this supreme policy concern. An important constituent 
element in this is the geographical considerations of one’s country; this has been common 
knowledge in public policy in every age and any country. In particular, as the world entered 
the age of imperialism in the 19th century, its attention turned increasingly to the steel and coal 
resources which were crucial to the industrial revolution, and the question of how one’s country’s 
geographical resources could be best put to use for the survival of the state became a prominent 
policy matters. The study of political geography intentionally ties this issue to the issue of state 
management, or “statecraft”, and this relationship has been further developed by the study of 
geopolitics. When we consider security policy as public policy, there is no escaping the need to 
understand the content and contemporary state of geopolitics, as it shares a deep connection 
with statecraft theory.
At the end of the 19th century, Swedish political geographer Rudolf Kjellen put forward the 
idea of geopolitics as a “theory and science of nations as geographical organisms and spatial 
phenomena”; this geopolitics flowered in the Europe of the late imperialist period as they fought 
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a succession of wars over resources, and eventually it spread like a disease throughout the 
entire world. Furthermore, at the time it became the foundational international relations concept 
in diplomatic theory. Naturally, the political leaders as well as diplomats, military officers and 
journalists came to like the geopolitical concept and use it with the national interest concept as a 
common denominator in envisioning and debating national strategy. Not only Great Britain, as the 
first imperialist nation and defender of its “Pax Britanica” hegemonic order, but also Germany, 
as a subsequent imperialist nation and challenger to British hegemony, developed geopolitics 
(essentially differing only in appearance); America, which was hovering between isolationism and 
universalism, developed its own unique geopolitics which contained elements geared towards 
both overland and overseas expansion. From the 19th to the 20th centuries, the natural trend was 
towards a domination of stable interaction within the international system by the dynamics of 
this balance of power game. And while the stark logic of this balance of power may no longer 
be in plain view, still now, at the start of the 21st century, it has a grip on the thinking of those 
responsible for national diplomatic and defense policy.
Germany had absorbed the philosophical influence of Kjellen and considered geopolitics 
as “national science” and, based on the fact that Germany had built itself up as an international 
power through a succession of wars, a “military science”; thus, given the atmosphere of the 
time, it was only natural that the loss of empire resulting from World War I would produce such 
crushing humiliation in Germany. Friedrich Ratzel’s geopolitical interpretation, which was 
heavily influenced by Hegel’s organic state theory, had been widely accepted within Germany; 
so, coated in the shame of losing in World War I, a pseudoscientific hue predominated Germany’s 
geopolitics, which included chauvinistic elements aimed at regaining lost territories as well 
as Germany’s position of power in the world. Between the world wars, momentum grew in 
Germany for a kinetic and strategic interpretation of geopolitics focused on the recovery of lost 
territories and political rehabilitation, and the Nazis turned this into a philosophical backing 
for their ambitions to seize power, giving it even more of a pseudoscientific coloring. It was 
Karl Haushofer, considered the father of German geopolitics, who established the ideologies of 
“Lebensraum” and “Autarchy” which formed the core of the Nazi political manifesto.1
Haushofer defined “Lebensraum” as an obligation of the state to provide citizens with 
sufficient space and resources, and he developed an organic theory of the state which overlapped 
with Ratzel’s biogeography, emphasizing “economic self-sufficiency” as an indispensible element 
in the survival of the state as an organic entity. An extension of this idea was the “Pan-regions” 
theory which incorporated Mackinder’s “Heartland Theory” and which divided the world into 
four “pan-regions”: Eurafrica, Pan Russia, Pan America and Pan Asia. Maps drawn according to 
these divisions had Germany at the center of Eurafrica, America at the center of Pan America, 
and Japan at the center of Pan Asia.2 Dissatisfied with the Versailles regime in the interwar 
period, Germany and Italy built a strong alliance based in this idea; meanwhile in Asia, Japan was 
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dissatisfied with the Washington regime which was based on the Washington Naval Disarmament 
Treaty of 1921 and the Nine Powers Treaty, and eventually joined Germany and Italy in the 
Tripartite Alliance which became a challenger to the Versailles / Washington regimes. The idea 
of a new Greater East Asian Order as well of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere which 
dominated Japanese thought during the 1930s and 1940s was clearly symbolic of a Japanese 
geopolitics which was an impressively symmetrical counterpart to German geopolitics.3 
In the meantime, in Britain Halford J. Mackinder attempted to develop a British idea of 
geopolitics. He wrote in 1904 of the coming end to Britain’s domination of ‘Pax Britanica’ and 
of the great threat which a Eurasian state would present to British global domination once a 
transcontinental railroad was completed (this was prior to the construction of the Trans-Siberian 
Railroad which was made possible by developments in railroad technology).4 He called the inner 
region of the Eurasian continent the global political “Pivot Area”, changing this to “Heartland” 
in 1919; he insisted that population increase and the development of industrialization, Eastern 
Europe is to be included in the Eurasian Heartland. From this he presented the famous thesis: 
“Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the 
World-Island.”5 Behind this thesis was the then-current worldview which saw Eastern Europe 
as the place where the struggle between Germany and Russia was fiercest, and whoever 
controlled this point of contact between Germans and Slavs, this “Mitteleuropa”, would decide 
who controlled the world’s multitudes. This geopolitical worldview is underpinned by a keen 
awareness of history and economic geography which proved darkly prescient when we consider 
the fierce struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union for control of Central Europe as well 
as the later post-World War II East-West conflict centered on the international order in Europe. 
Mackinder’s geopolitics even now captivates the researchers and policymakers of Europe.
Meanwhile in the United States, Admiral Alfred T. Mahan was developing his “sea power” 
theory. This theory incorporated the special nature of the United States as a continental state 
as well as a maritime state, being bordered by both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, and 
it explicitly specified a geopolitical direction for America to take as a new empire. From the 
late 19th century through the 20th century, the face of America was changing and this theory 
greatly influenced its global strategy.6 Like Mackinder, Mahan also recognized the geopolitical 
importance of Eurasia and saw Russia as a dominant continental state whose control spanned 
from Europe to Asia. Mahan also predicted a clash between the continental power of Russia and 
the maritime power of Britain between the 30th and 40th parallels and explained that the secret to 
global domination was linkage of key bases around the perimeter of Eurasia held in an alliance 
between Britain and the U.S. Furthermore, he explained that a four-way alliance between the 
U.S., Britain, Germany and Japan (with the U.S. and British alliance at its core) should be formed 
in common cause against Russia and China and emphasized the need for America to transform 
itself quickly from a continental power to a maritime power. The “blue water strategy” which 
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he emphasized served as the basis for America’s shift away from the traditional isolationism of 
the Monroe Doctrine, which it had pursued since the mid-19th century, towards its later policy 
of interventionism.7 Mahan’s push in his later years for building a foothold in the Pacific and, in 
particular, his emphasis on pursuing an open door policy in the western Pacific, demonstrated 
somewhat of an interventionist philosophy, while his ideas for demanding equal trading rights 
for America as a “latecomer” empire shares a similar foundation with the thinking underlying 
economic statecraft.8 At the same time, his ideas had an impact on geo-economics, which is a 
primary building block for modern American geopolitics.
In fact, the administrations of William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. seemed 
inspired by Mahan’s geopolitical theory; on top of the 1899 annexation of the Philippines 
following the Spanish-American War and the acquisition of Hawaii, Guam, Puerto Rico, America 
expanded its control from the Panama Canal Zone (the geographical equivalent of America’s 
backyard) to Central America and the Caribbean, giving it secure footing as a “latecomer” 
empire. In addition, Theodore Roosevelt’s racial prejudice, which considered the white race to be 
superior, was behind his expanded interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, through which Central 
and South American countries were put one by one under America’s protection and control; 
meanwhile, Roosevelt used the logic of “open doors and equal opportunity” to promote America’s 
advance into Asia and the Pacific. Despite America’s involvement in mediating a peaceful end to 
the Russo-Japanese War, America did not form an alliance with Japan, as envisioned by Mahan; 
rather, it formulated the “Orange Plan” which saw Japan as a potential enemy. This ultimately 
opened the path for the sea power clash in the western Pacific between Japan and the U.S. 
following World War I and, eventually, to the tragedy of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
In this way, Mahan’s sea power theory paved the way for a change in American geo-
strategy in the first half of the 20th century and was the definitive theoretical basis for a shift 
from the era of “Pax Britanica” to the era of “Pax Americana”, as evidenced by the dramatic 
increase in naval and air power, particularly the aircraft carrier strike force, which was reflected 
in America’s victory in World War II. While he was comparable to other geo-politicians of his day 
in that he equally recognized the importance of Eurasia, Mahan exhibited a clear break from 
Mackinder’s view of the mainland as the Heartland in that he saw America as a “continent-sized 
island” and emphasized sea power as the basis for hegemony. The legacy of Mahan’s worldview 
and geopolitical understanding is still seen in American geopolitical studies and exerts a large 
influence on American diplomatic and security policy. Of those who have followed Mahan, 
Nicholas J. Spykman was a leader in geopolitical research from the interwar period through the 
postwar period.
Spykman posited the Rimland Theory in contrast to Mackinder’s Heartland Theory, 
sparking a geopolitical debate while making a revolutionary contribution. Certainly, Spykman’s 
Rimland Theory was influenced by the “Marginal Crescent” theory, which covered the outer 
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perimeter of the Heartland, and in this sense appears to be a descendent of Mackinder’s theory. 
However, the fact that the Rimland Theory was conceived with the idea of victory in the war 
against Germany, emphasizing that it was the combination of British and American sea power 
with Russian land power that could stop Germany from controlling the rim of the Eurasian 
continent and, by extension, the world island, set it clearly apart from the primary assertion of 
Mackinder’s Heartland Theory. Spykman viewed the large population and available resources of 
the European coast land, the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia and China as the key to global 
domination, insisting that, “Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls 
the destinies of the world.”9 While it may seem that his emphasis on the importance of Eurasia 
makes his geopolitics similar to Mackinder’s, there are clear differences in their areas of focus.10 
In a sense, Spykman’s Rimland Theory can be seen as grounded in Mahan’s sea power theory 
while attempting to synthesize it with Mackinder’s Heartland Theory.11
The Rimland Theory was proposed by Spykman in the early 1940s and was grounded in the 
fear that countries such as Germany and Japan would control the European and Asian rimland 
as well as build a network of naval and air bases through which they would control the Eurasian 
rimland. It is fair to see it as a reaction against the idea of “Lebensraum” control sought by 
Haushofer’s German geopolitics and Japanese geopolitics and as the product of an era when the 
world was locked in the life or death struggle of World War II. The Rimland Theory is projected 
in America’s “containment” strategy employed against the Soviet Union after World War II. The 
Soviet Union seized on this thinking with its strategy of incursion into the rimland, using it in 
the development of its European, Asian and Middle Eastern policies during the Cold War era 
and engaging in a fierce strategic struggle with the U.S. and Great Britain for the Heartland and 
the rimland. Even after the end of the Cold War and into the present day, this construct remains 
fundamentally unchanged and continues to govern the global situation. The first and second 
Gulf (Iraq) Wars of the George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush administrations as well as the 
Afghanistan War were intended to secure American control in the rimland, while the concept of 
the “arc of the unstable” raised by the Bush administration combined with the logic of greater 
involvement in the regions and countries within this arc can be said to be the contemporary 
incarnation of the Rimland Theory. This will be discussed in more detail later.
2. Clash of U.S.-Soviet Geopolitics during the Cold War
It is not at all the case that geopolitical thinking was extinguished from nations’ 
policymaking calculations as a result of the collapse of Hitler’s Third Reich in Germany and the 
vanishing influence of Haushofer’s Munich school; instead, the geopolitical thinking that was 
budding just before the end of the war and which envisioned a struggle between the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. over the postwar international order was refined in response to rapid developments in 
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military science and technology and was finished with a diplomatic and security policymaking 
process. A fusion of classical geopolitical methodology, which was encouraged by the formation 
of an international order with a bipolar system, and a new geopolitical methodology, which was 
stimulated by the revolutionary developments in military science and technology, was promoted.
Ever since the introduction of aircraft into the First World War, the relative importance of 
aircraft in military strategy-making and tactical decision-making has increased exponentially. The 
increased flying distance and speed of aircraft eventually fostered the incorporation of strategic 
bombardment in strategy theory, which pushed war definitively in the direction of a competition 
for air superiority. The Japanese military’s bombing of Chongqing and America’s strategic 
bombing of Japan hastened the emergence of total war, where there is no threshold between the 
front lines and rear. World War II produced untold numbers of noncombatant casualties from 
strategic bombing and deeply embedded the tragedy of war in human history, and it once again 
provided proof to the ancient paradox that it is the extreme conditions of war that give birth to 
revolutionary progress in military technology.
However, at the start of the Cold War, American geopolitics was contained within an 
ideological frame of anti-communism, and it was the geopolitics of James Burnham which 
served to inflame the fever of McCarthyism and contribute to America’s paralysis. During the 
1930s, Burnham was a Trotskyite steeped in radical communist thinking who had participated 
in the formation of the American Workers Party; however, he lost faith in Lev D. Trotsky after 
Trotsky defended the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, 
and Burnham broke with the ideas of communism. As a member of the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) created in 1941, Burnham foresaw the coming Cold War with the Soviet Union 
and produced a series of papers analyzing the world through a geopolitical prism. In a sense, he 
presented a geopolitical viewpoint at the end of World War II which anticipated “containment” 
theory (to be discussed later) and had an impact on American geopolitics during the early years 
of the Cold War. However, his increasing stridency vis-à-vis the Soviet Union led him to embrace 
an extreme, McCarthy-like geopolitics, and he came to be seen by the intelligentsia as a heretical 
geo-politician.12
The alliance that had existed between the U.S. and the Soviets was primarily aimed at 
resisting the Axis Powers, and it disappeared once the war was over; now a sense of threat was 
permeating American policymaking circles as they saw the Soviets as military victors who had 
not lost their control over Eurasia. Meanwhile, Iosif B. Stalin, who had concluded the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact with Adolf Hitler, solidifying his power base within the Soviet Union, was known 
to hate the very essence of German geopolitics following Hitler’s betrayal and began conceiving 
towards the end of the war a simultaneous defense of his sphere of control, which was the 
Heartland, with an advance into the rimland of Europe and Asia. If we think of World War II as a 
battle over the heartland and rimland of Europe, centered on Central Europe (Mitteleuropa), and 
17
Takehiko Yamamoto
over the heartland and rimland of Asia, centered on China, can we then summarize the 40 years 
Cold War between East and West that followed World War II as a conflict between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union over control of the same central regions?
In reality, the “iron curtain” that was drawn across Central Europe from Stettin on the Baltic 
Sea to Trieste on the Adriatic Sea and divided Europe into East and West, and the “bamboo 
curtain” in Asia that divided China and Taiwan, North and South Korea and North and South 
Vietnam, represented rimlands surrounding the heartland, and it was these rimlands which 
were the frontlines of Soviet-U.S. confrontation. As everyone knows, the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union squared off directly at the borders of East and West Germany and along the border of 
Czechoslovakia, and in 1949 the members of the Western Bloc formed the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) which was countered in 1959 by the formation of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization (WTO) by the Eastern Bloc.
Since the Stalin era, the Soviet Union’s geopolitical interest was a continuation of the 
traditional geopolitical tradition of Imperial Russia, namely to control Eurasia, establish a sphere 
of influence in Eastern Europe, promote its influence in Central Europe and expand its political 
influence on Western Europe. Its actions during the 1940s and 50s, including the staging of 
the first Berlin Crisis and its military interventions in the Poznani protests in Poland and 1956 
uprising in Hungary, were clearly intended to secure the Soviet sphere of influence in the 
territories surrounding the Heartland. The military intervention by Leonid I. Brezhnev in August 
1968 during the “Prague Spring” as a reaction to the Soviet Union’s collapsing sphere of influence 
can also be taken in this context. The “Brezhnev Doctrine”, which pushed the idea of limited 
sovereignty and legitimized military intervention for the sake of defending the international 
socialist community, is the best expression of what constituted Soviet geopolitics.13 The Soviet’s 
geo-strategy involved the creation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) 
in 1949 as an economic expression of the defense of the socialist community, and used its military 
expression of this defense, the WTO, as a tool for the invasion of Czechoslovakia; this created an 
impressively symmetric counter to the West’s – particularly America’s – geo-strategy.
Similar to the West, Russian geopolitics since the 19th century had their grounding in a 
pan-Slavic conservative mentality. Russian geopolitics have been guided by geo-politicians and 
historians such as P. N. Savitskyi and G. V. Vernadskiy, and even after the Russian Revolution, 
they continued to emphasize the importance of a unified Eurasia and Slavic identity under the 
banner of “socialist continentalism”.14 Initially used as a concept tied to the ideal of “socialism 
in one country”, it was after the establishment of Stalinism that it came to take on an imperialist 
flavor in the socialist vocabulary. The incorporation of Central Asia into the Soviet empire, the 
annexation of the three Baltic states, and the establishment of socialist regimes and puppet 
leaders one after another in central and eastern European countries immediately following the 
end of World War II is a clear example of this concept in action, creating the Communist Bloc in a 
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single burst.
Meanwhile, America was concentrating its resources on the defense of the European 
rimland revolving around NATO. In 1947 it carried out large-scale economic and military 
assistance based on the Marshall Plan with the aim of stopping the Soviet Union from infiltrating 
Western Europe; this put not only geopolitics but also geo-economics into practice. This Cold 
War expression of geo-strategy was a clear merger of the political and economic strategy of 
“containment”. As will be discussed later, this sort of merger of political and economic strategy in 
America’s geo-strategy would be modified and applied even to the alliance of Western countries 
following the Cold War.
In Asia as well there were efforts to prevent the infiltration of communism into Japan, which 
is the center of the Asian rimland; these efforts took the form of the 1951 San Francisco Peace 
Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which focused on defending the East Asian rimland 
comprised of the islands extending from the Aleutian Islands to Japan and continuing on to the 
Philippines. The South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was also created as a defense 
against Soviet infiltration.
In 1950 the Korean War flared up, and America’s slow geopolitical response in relation 
to the policies of China and the Soviets resulted in a fierce conflict. If we review the history 
of Northeast Asia, we see that the Korean peninsula is the softest region in terms of political 
geography and is located in a position that makes it easily susceptible to intervention by the 
surrounding powers of China, Russia, Japan, etc. Knowing that the Korean peninsula is the most 
sensitive area geopolitically in the Asian rimland, why did America not push its involvement in 
the Korean peninsula at the start of the Cold War? Is it because America was not as conscious 
of the benefit to it that the Asian rimland presented compared with the European rimland? To 
answer these questions, we must analyze the geopolitical recognition structure of American 
policymakers at the time in addition to looking at the history and politically analyzing the Cold 
War in Asia. In any case, since the 19th century the Korean people have found themselves 
sandwiched between Japan, China and Russia and, as a result, the subject of invasion; this is 
unmistakably similar to the history of hardship experienced by Poland, which is sandwiched 
between Germany and Russia and has been divided up between the two on numerous occasions. 
The term “Polish Corridor” referred to an area of conflict and land division between the northern 
power (Russia) and the western power (Germany); considering that the Korean peninsula 
represents a topographical appendage on the edge of the Eurasian continent, it has been, 
geopolitically speaking, a corridor between the northern power (Russia) and the far eastern 
powers (China and Japan) subject to conflict and partitioning. And although the players may have 
changed, the Korean War sandwiched the Korean peninsula between China and the U.S., and 
the semi-permanent division of the peninsula resulting from the armistice of 1953 continues even 
now to be a source of strategic uncertainty in Northeast Asia.
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In 1948, Israel was established as a nation and found itself having the softest position 
within the Middle Eastern rimland; it was a fragile area that became a focus of the U.S.-Soviet 
struggle. If we think of Central Europe and the Asian perimeter region as the first rimland, 
then the Middle East would comprise the second rimland. From early on the Middle East was 
recognized as being rich in petroleum and other energy resources, and this greatly increased the 
likelihood the East and West would bring their conflicts to it. America quickly formed the Central 
Treaty Organization (CENTO) to safeguard against Soviet infiltration, as it was deeply aware of 
the strategic importance of the Middle East as the second rimland. America’s role in brokering 
ceasefires for the first through fourth Israeli-Arab wars as well as its role in the separate peace 
agreement reached in 1979 between Egypt and Israel can also be viewed in this context.
America’s strategic interest in the Middle East as, what I call, the second rimland has 
continued since the end of the Cold War up to this very day. From the standpoint of resource 
geopolitics and geo-economics, the strategic importance of the Middle East as a treasure-trove 
of resources makes giving it up fantastically difficult for America. We see the sharp reaction of 
the Carter administration to the Iranian Revolution and the granting of 500 million dollars in 
military aid to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein during the eight years Iran-Iraq War, after which America 
gave Saddam Hussein the back of its hand during the first Gulf War by imposing military 
and economic sanctions. And with regard to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 by the Bush 
administration, if we understand the resource geopolitics and geo-economics entwined with 
America’s petroleum interests, then it is easy to understand why the existence of weapons of 
mass destruction as a justification for the war failed.15
Be that as it may, during the Cold War issues in all areas, from military and diplomatic 
political areas (high politics) to traditionally nonpolitical areas (low politics) such as economics 
and technology, became entwined and politicized with the logic of the Cold War and subject 
to securitization.16 If we look at the economic recovery of Japan during the occupation, we see 
that the administration of Harry S. Truman approved a national security directive (NSC 13/2) 
in 1948 which stopped the payment of compensation to Japan and lifted many of the restrictions 
that had been in place on Japanese industry; this was connected with the later introduction of 
the Dodge Plan and the provision of funding from the IMF to spur exports, helping to catalyze 
Japan’s economic recovery; all of this can be understood within the context of the developing 
Cold War.17 Also, the international Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls 
(COCOM) founded in 1949 in opposition to the communist bloc, as well as the China Committee 
for Export Controls (CHINCOM) founded in 1952 as a sub-system of COCOM, were colored 
by the geopolitical and geo-economic mission of the Cold War and functioned with the aim of 
economically and technologically containing the “bamboo curtain”. Naturally, the members 
of these international organizations were coerced into being involved in embargos and other 
mechanisms as part of their economic statecraft.18
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The geopolitics of the Cold War era were firmly undergirded by the philosophy of political 
realism which saw the ending of the grand alliance that existed during World War II and a global 
confrontation with the Soviets immediately after the imminent end of the war as an inevitable sea 
change in the times. Realist philosophy is, however, quite diverse, and with regard to the issue of 
geopolitics, differences in terms of content will emerge depending upon the matter under review. 
However, during the Cold War era a robust realist philosophy centering on “containment” was 
predominant. Regardless of the fact that the true meaning of “containment”, as advocated by 
George F. Kennan, is often misunderstood, it had an intense, defining influence on the structure 
of postwar international politics. Kennan’s “containment” theory was laid out in the so-called “X” 
article, which was virtually the bible of Cold War thinking, and expressed a diplomatic philosophy 
which summarized the American diplomatic mentality since the country’s founding and is still 
discussed today.19 It became, so to speak, the orthodox view in American geopolitics.
However, the storm of McCarthyism during the 1950s skewed American geopolitics, 
swallowing up the idea of “containment” in the process. Despite the fact that the geopolitics of 
James Burnham, which we looked at earlier, incorporated here and there the views of Mackinder, 
it was presented as an ideology which substantially opposed “containment” and was based on 
a fierce anti-communism. He saw “containment” as a defensive strategy which, if limited solely 
to defensive mechanisms, would be hard-pressed to control the expansion of the Soviet empire. 
Burnham wrote that the effort to contain communism “is as futile as to try to stop a lawn from 
getting wet by mopping up each drop from a rotating sprinkler…. [T]o stop the flow we must 
get at the source.” Thus he advocated an aggressive posture towards the Soviet empire and the 
communist bloc.20 That his assertion was well received by some conservatives is unsurprising 
given the ideological current of McCarthyism that was dominant at the time. If we thus view the 
“containment” strategy, which was the primary axis of America’s Cold War strategy between the 
1940s and 1950s, as the “orthodox” view in American geopolitics, then Burnham’s view would 
have been the “heretical” view.
Since World War I, America has abhorred totalitarianism and authoritarianism in contrast 
to the values of freedom and democracy, and the tradition of “Wilsonianism”, which pursued 
policies to isolate such regimes, was continued in the interwar period and during World War II by 
Roosevelt to isolate totalitarian regimes, and this in turn was continued in the Cold War strategy 
to “contain” communism. The post-Cold War “containment” strategy against “rogue states” 
is also nothing more than another continuation of this thinking. Thus it is safe to say that the 
“containment” strategy has colored basic American strategy for a century, extending from the 
start of the 20th to the start of the 21st centuries. In this sense, “containment” is still the orthodox 
view in American geopolitics.
However, if we look more carefully we see that the “orthodox” view and Burnham’s 
“heretical” views occasionally mixed, in particular in the projection of America’s global strategy. 
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Of course, America’s strategy during the Cold War vis-à-vis the Soviets was one of “containment” 
based on National Security Council Decision No.68 (NSC 68), but as such examples as Kennedy’s 
brinksmanship during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the “Alliance for Progress” policies 
implemented in Latin America, and Regan’s strategy of competition with the Soviets and the 
invasion of Grenada in 1983 show, the aggressive geopolitical response advocated by Burnham’s 
“heretical” view was sometimes mixed into the “orthodox” view. America’s intervention in the 
Vietnam War can also be seen in this context. Similarly, George H. W. Bush’s defiance of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) in invading Panama in December 1989 and George 
W. Bush’s Iraq War can also be seen within this trend. The ideological framework of the neo-
conservatives who supported Bush’s first administration which began in 2001 did not retreat 
into the tradition of “containment” but sought to aggressively promote the strategy of American 
empire, and in this way showed a common foundation of Burham-esque messianic activism.
Thus we see that “containment” had an immeasurably large impact on the many “cold 
warriors” (politicians, diplomats and strategists) who devised and executed America’s strategy 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and that “containment” still underpins American global strategy even 
in the post-Cold War era. This is best demonstrated by the fact that President Harry S. Truman, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Richard M. Nixon, Secretary of State John F. Dulles, Dean G. Acheson 
and other influential politicians, as well as Henry A. Kissinger, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski and 
other power elite who have been in the inner circles of government have uniformly advocated 
“containment” as the central pillar of America’s anticommunist strategy.
The “containment” strategy which they pursued was simply a fusion of the Heartland and 
Rimland theories, and its primary focus was on preventing Soviet and Chinese infiltration of the 
rimland regions of the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, the Caribbean, and 
Southeast Asia. Thus, America’s geo-strategy during the Cold War was a two-tiered approach 
which sought to geopolitically “contain” the communist bloc in the Eurasian Heartland while at 
the same time economically “contain” it by offering strategic assistance to the Third World. This 
economic “containment” strategy in particular brought into sharp relief the economic aspects 
of geopolitics and contributed to the drawing of new theoretical boundaries for geopolitical 
interpretations. The new theory of geo-economics is a result of this. Let us therefore officially 
simplify America’s Cold War strategy into geo-strategy = geopolitics + geo-economics. We will 
discuss this more later.
In 1947, William C. Bullit first put forward the Domino Theory; this theory was used as a basis 
for preventing the countries of Southeast Asia from “falling like dominos” to Soviet power which 
would infiltrate the region via China.21 The Vietnam War is the prime example of this theory. The 
strategy was to work with other developed nations to offer economic assistance to the Southeast 
Asian countries around Vietnam and thereby prevent the infiltration of communism; it was a clear 
exercise of the geo-strategy of “geopolitics + geo-economics”. The Marshall Plan assistance which 
22
National Security Policy and Contemporary Geopolitics
preceded this in Europe was another example of this formula in action as were the “Alliance for 
Progress” policies started under the Kennedy administration to prevent the spread of communism 
in Latin America and the Middle East policies connected with the first through fourth Israeli-Arab 
wars.
3. Transformation of Geopolitics during and after the Cold War
It must be kept in mind that late in the Cold War, America was declining in position 
economically within the world, and this effected a transformation in the nature of America’s geo-
strategy. Geopolitically there was no change in the strategy to “contain” Soviet influence to the 
Heartland; however, starting in the 1970s, America sought to not only geo-economically continue 
“containing” Soviet strength but also to lessen the economic strength of allies, in particular Japan. 
America saw the unified effort of Japan’s public and private sectors to make Japan an exporting 
nation as a strategy of neomercantilism and through the end of the Cold War and into the mid-
1990s doggedly pursued a trade strategy aimed at altering this. A major ideologue advocating for 
this strategy was Edward N. Luttwak.22 From the late 1970s through the early 1990s, American 
society was focused on the idea of American decline, but this Cold War era geo-economic 
thinking was pushed into the background as a new thinking focused on the Japanese threat 
to America came to prominence. It is hard to overstate the sense of threat to national security 
America’s power elite felt was posed by the growing direct investment in America by Japan.23 As 
George H. W. Bush’s “jobs, jobs, jobs” statement in 1992 prior to a visit to Japan shows, this sense 
of threat from Japan was transforming into economic patriotism.24 A full-scale, dual strategy of 
technological protectionism by the U. S. was evinced by the implementation into policy from the 
late 80s onward of strategic trade policy theory and intellectual property rights protection policy 
theory by America, making restrictions on the transfer of advanced technology developed first 
by America to allied countries the main axis which works in concert with the existing COCOM 
restrictions on technological transfers to the Soviet Bloc. 
Japan experienced firsthand what it was to be in the firing line of this strategy. The first 
instance was in April 1987 when it came to light that Toshiba Machine (a subsidiary of Toshiba) 
had illegally exported a nine-axis simultaneous control machine tool used in the precision 
polishing of propellers to the Soviet Union. This incident greatly shook America’s confidence in 
its ability to ensure military technological superiority vis-à-vis the Soviets via CoCom regulations 
and increased Japan bashing within the U.S. Congress. The second instance was the full-scale 
implementation of policies aimed at restricting the overseas transfer of dual-use advanced 
technology as a result of American decline technologically in relation to Japan and other 
countries. The “Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act” enacted in 1988 during Regan’s second 
term included the Garn amendment which was a provision targeted to Toshiba Corporation 
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regarding the first instance mentioned above. With regard to the second instance, the “Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act” contained the Exon-Florio amendment which restricted foreign 
competitors in Japan and Western-allied nations from purchasing American companies connected 
with American national security.25 
As is widely known, the first and second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I and 
II), although established to ensure “crisis stability”, were focused primarily on maintaining U.S. 
second strike retaliatory superiority vis-à-vis the Soviets.26 In other words, their main priority 
is to ensure the superiority vis-à-vis the Soviets of America’s submarine-launched ballistic 
missile system as a retaliatory capability not vulnerable to a Soviet first strike; thus, the crucial 
component in this is maintaining an overwhelming advantage in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
capability. Toshiba’s transfer to the Soviet Union of a nine-axis simultaneous control machine tool 
used in the precision polishing of propellers allowed the Soviets to dampen the propeller noise 
of their submarines; thus, Toshiba’s actions were viewed as collaborating with the enemy and 
dealing a definitive blow to U.S. ASW capability.
President Ronald W. Reagan himself referred to the Soviet Union as an “evil empire”, and 
his administration was fiercely anticommunist and anti-Soviet, appearing on the scene harboring 
a sense of crisis about Soviet military expansion overtaking the U.S. The top priority of the Regan 
administration was to prevent the expansion of the “window of vulnerability” which accompanied 
the recognition by SALT I and II of a quantitative superiority by the Soviet Union in terms of 
ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and thus sought to shift from the “war 
fighting” stance of the Carter administration to a “war winning” stance. It goes without saying, 
then, that Toshiba’s violation of CoCom regulations which led to a deterioration of America’s 
ASW capabilities supremely irritated the Republican-controlled Congress and anti-Soviet 
hardliners, such as Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger who had instituted the “enhanced 
military competitiveness” strategy aimed at the Russians during Regan’s first term. 
It goes without saying that the intensified sense of crisis about the Soviet’s push to overtake 
the U.S. in the nuclear arms race occurred after Regan took office. With regard to the need to 
stop the flow of dual-use advanced technologies from the Western world to the Soviet bloc and 
for America to revise its regulatory mechanisms for strategic materials and technology transfer 
to the communist bloc under America’s national export control system and CoCom, both those 
inside and outside the government had been aware of it for a long time. Numerous reports 
were issued under the Carter administration, but the Bucy Report in particular stood out for 
its assertion that radical reform was needed in America’s national export control system; its 
delineation of a future export control system for America and a strengthening of involvement in 
this system by the Defense Department had revolutionary implications.27 
Be that as it may, following the appointment of Richard N. Perl, who was seen by many 
as a “super technology hawk”, to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security in 
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the DoD at the start of Regan’s first term, greater involvement was sought by the DoD in those 
strategic materials and technology transfer policymaking decisions which had been heretofore 
left to the Commerce Department as well as in negotiations with the CoCom members which 
had been the primary responsibility of the State Department. This pressure by, what Casper 
Weinberger nicknamed, the “California Mafia” escalated to the point where William A. Root, 
America’s representative in CoCom for 12 years, resigned in protest. These efforts by Perl 
and others were driven by a type of messianic anticommunism and became the pretext for the 
Regan administration’s promotion of a strategy of increased military competitiveness vis-à-vis the 
Soviets. This turn of events can only be seen as the reemergence of Burnham’s geopolitical view 
which we discussed earlier in the context of the early Cold War.
Meanwhile, a strategy of enhanced industrial competitiveness aimed at America’s Western 
allies was pursued in parallel to its strategy of enhanced military competitiveness aimed at the 
Soviets. The conscious implementation of this strategy began in the latter half of the 1970s 
when the successive technological revolutions of America’s Western allies began to erode 
America’s overwhelming postwar technological superiority in the marketplace and foreign capital 
was increasingly being used to acquire American companies. The “Young Report” put out in 
1985 recommended a policy for rejuvenating American industrial competitiveness, including 
increasing federal expenditure in research and development budgets, improving the environment 
for investment, and reorganizing the education and training systems in place for cultivating 
engineers; however, when this report came out in the mid-1980s, American society was in deep 
distress over the idea of American decline.28
America, which could project its military force throughout the world and which maintained 
a Defense Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB) strong enough to repel other countries, 
was shaken by the strengthened competitiveness of Japan and other countries from the 1970s 
onward in the area of dual-use technologies. America’s remarkable relative decline in the area 
of semiconductors (particularly memory chips), regarded as a core component of industry 
and the most important technological element of both military and civilian technologies, left 
the American semiconductor manufacturing industry open to attack by Japanese exports, with 
the result being an acceleration in the transfer overseas of American manufacturing bases of 
operation. Similarly, in the area of “mother machines”, which have dual military and civilian 
application in the machine tools industry, America lagged behind Japan and others in terms of 
technological innovation, forcing the U.S. to face the reality of losing its domestic market share 
to these competitors. A wave of debate swept the U.S. with the conclusion that a deficiency in 
America’s surge capabilities in the event of an emergency would result in America not only being 
unable to fulfill its national security obligation but its international security obligations as well. 
Against a backdrop of calls for increased restrictions on the use of foreign capital to purchase 
national defense-related companies, a sense of crisis raged.
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This reality was at the forefront of America’s mind when it adopted the dual strategy of 
enhanced military competitiveness against the Soviets and enhanced industrial competitiveness 
as the core of its global strategy in the 1980s. In other words, the waning of American hegemony 
in the international military and industrial order necessitated the pursuit of this dual strategy. 
What is more, this dual strategy resulted in the introduction of policies seeking to not only 
prevent the outflow of science and technological resources in the area of applied research but 
also in the area of basic research; never before had such policies been needed, and the adoption 
of this sort of two-front strategy indicates just how strong the sense of crisis was during the 
Regan administration. The resultant policies meant severe restrictions on the participation of 
foreigners in science and technology-related societies and seminars as well as tours of research 
facilities in the U.S. 
Needless to say, America’s fierce struggle with the Soviet Union over R&D in advanced 
dual-use technologies saw a heightened sensitivity to “containment” of technological R&D. 
And with roughly 70% of federal military-related R&D funding coming from the Pentagon, 
the Department of Energy and other sources, a “military-industrial-scientific complex” was 
created, making it dif ficult for foreigners to access the results of R&D.29 For reasons of 
national security, even sensitive information relating to basic research in such areas as physics, 
chemistry, biotechnology, biochemistry, immunology and pharmacology thus became subject 
to confidentiality for foreign researchers. A type of information paranoia about the outflow of 
advanced applied technology and basic research carried out in the U.S. was reached with the 
issuance of Presidential Order 12356 in 1982 under the Regan administration. This largely 
reversed the relative openness in external transfers of scientific and technological information 
that had existed until then.
Naturally, American scientists and engineers vigorously opposed restrictions on the freedom 
of international scientific and technological exchange. The fact that the National Academy of 
Sciences voiced opposition shows the sense of alarm the scientific community felt over this. 
The President of Cornell University, Dale Corson, as head of the National Academy of Sciences, 
drafted a report which emphasized the importance of maintaining openness and freedom in 
science and technology and criticized the excessive restrictions placed on the overseas transfer 
of scientific and technical research, such as the Regan administration’s restrictions on allowing 
foreign researchers into the country. The report reflected the consensus of American scientists 
and engineers that, while a narrow range of restrictions may be unavoidable, wide-ranging 
restrictions present a serious challenge to the development of science and technology.30 With 
this report in mind, the Office of the President issued National Security Decision Directive 
189-Fundamental Research (NSDD-189), laying out America’s basic policy on “deemed exports” 
(to be discussed later), and this policy remains in effect to this day.31
The “Corson Report” also contributed to the later ideological basis adopted by the U.S. 
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with regard to the outflow of scientific and technical resources; it is reflected in post-9/11 
export control policies and is considered the bible of basic scientific research and military-
related advanced technology intellectual resources protection. This is epitomized by the strict 
immigration and visa policies for foreign researchers set in the “Patriot Act” of 2001 as well as the 
strengthening of “deemed export” controls affecting the outflow of technologies from companies 
and public research organizations. Japan and other countries have fallen into step with the U.S. 
in institutionalizing their “deemed export” controls, and this is clearly the result of an awareness 
of the need for concerted action against terrorism by the international community in the wake of 
9/11. 
Thus we see that in the trend towards technology “nationalism” in the U.S. since the late 
1970s, the “Bucy Report”, “Young Report” and “Corson Report” served as a basis for a major vein 
of geo-strategy in America from the late Cold War era through the post-Cold War era and into the 
current post-post-Cold War era after 9/11, and it looks likely to continue into the next era. 
Even if a reversion to the two-front strategy of the Regan administration does not entail a 
change in the simple geo-strategic equation, it does involve the introduction of new variable in the 
form of geo-science and technology. In other words, they have a connection with geopolitics and 
geo-economics, with the U.S. coming to view science and technology as critical sources of power 
and wealth which bolster its standing politically and economically in the world, and American 
security policy has come to be encompassed by an omnidirectional science and technology 
protectionism. Geopolitics and geo-economics are both intimately connected with resource and 
market acquisition, and the dynamics of geo-science and technology “containment” as variables 
will only serve to enhance this connection.
My concept of “geo-science and technology” can be defined as “scientific and technical 
activities involving strong financial support by the government for research and development 
(R&D) by public research institutions and private companies, with the results of this R&D 
containing the potential for triggering fierce military and economic competition with other 
countries”. This concept ties in with and mediates geopolitics and geo-economics as a subordinate 
concept. This relationship is graphically represented in Figure 1 below.
Fig.1  “Geo-science and technology” as a connecting concept between 
geopolitics and geo-economics32
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Luttwak maintains that the primary R&D activities of a country are contained in a sub-category 
of geo-economics.33 However, experience shows that the decision to invest state resources into 
R&D involves both the past and present geopolitical and geo-economic motivations of policymakers. 
This is because policymakers view the results of scientific and technological activity to be a source 
of national power and wealth, and the top priority of policymakers in such activities is to use them to 
create and maintain a relative military and economic advantage over other countries. Those most 
familiar with its status as a decisive element in the waxing or waning of a country’s intellectual 
assets and international power are the leaders of Britain, which saw it cost them their hegemony 
between the 19th century and World War I, and the leaders of the U.S., which saw it strengthen their 
hegemony from the 1970s through the 1990s.34  Thus, the nation’s R&D and scientific and 
technological activities are more than a sub-category of geo-economics, they are a connecting and 
mediating element between geopolitics and geo-economics  
In reality, geo-strategic interactions between two or more countries are dynamic and operate in 
the gulf between these two extremes. Also, it must be kept in mind that the changes in geo-scientific 
and technological policy, and thus changes in the possibility and scope of international scientific and 
technological cooperation, depend largely on the domestic economic situation and international 
market standing of a country as well as the strategic interdependence between countries, particularly 
their level of economic interdependence. 
If we apply this model in interpreting the conspicuous geo-science and technology strategy of 
America during the Regan administration, we see a tightening of restrictions on the outflow of 
                                                  
32 Takehiko Yamamoto, “Power, Wealth and Technology Transfer in World Politics: Political Dynamics 
of Science and Technology Activities in East Asia,” Waseda Political Studies, No. 33, March, 2002, p.26. 
33 See, Edward N. Luttwak, “From Geopolitics to Geo-economics,” op. cit., pp.18-19. 
34 See, Geoff Demarest, Geoproperty: Foreign Affairs, National Security and Property Rights. (London: 
Frank Cass), 1998, pp.110-148. 
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Luttwak maintains that the primary R&D activities of a country are contained in a sub-
category of geo-economics.33 However, experience shows that the decision to invest state 
resources into R&D involves both the past and present geopolitical and geo-economic motivations 
of policymakers. This is because policymakers view the results of scientific and technological 
activity to be a source of national power and wealth, and the top priority of policymakers in such 
activities is to use them to create and maintain a relative military and economic advantage over 
other countries. Those most familiar with its status as a decisive element in the waxing or waning 
of a country’s intellectual assets and international power are the leaders of Britain, which saw it 
cost them their hegemony between the 19th century and World War I, and the leaders of the U.S., 
which saw it strengthen their hegemony from the 1970s through the 1990s.34 Thus, the nation’s 
R&D and scientific and technological activities are more than a sub-category of geo-economics, 
they are a connecting and mediating element between geopolitics and geo-economics 
In reality, geo-strategic interactions between two or more countries are dynamic and operate 
in the gulf between these two extremes. Also, it must be kept in mind that the changes in geo-
scientific and technological policy, and thus changes in the possibility and scope of international 
scientific and technological cooperation, depend largely on the domestic economic situation and 
international market standing of a country as well as the strategic interdependence between 
countries, particularly their level of economic interdependence.
If we apply this model in interpreting the conspicuous geo-science and technology strategy 
of America during the Regan administration, we see a tightening of restrictions on the outflow 
of domestically developed military-related dual-use technologies and a stepped up effort to 
“incorporate” the dual-use technologies of allies aimed at rejuvenating American hegemony. 
The issues that befell Japan in the joint research and development of the support fighter F-2 
(FSX) during the Bush Sr. administration are an example of the former, while the exceptions for 
America incorporated into Japan’s three principles for weapons technology exports which were 
approved by the Nakasone cabinet in January 1983 are an example of the intentional promotion 
of transfers to the U.S. of Japanese spin-on dual-use advanced technologies.35 America’s call for its 
allies to take part in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) can also be included as an example of 
the latter.
This sort of geo-scientific and technological thinking in public policy by the U.S.continues 
to have an intractable influence even now, 25 years after the end of the Cold War, and the world 
is surprisingly indif ferent. The prosecution of Japanese researchers under the pretext that 
they smuggled out Alzheimer’s gene-related materials has still been fresh in people’s minds. 
This incident was a violation of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 <Public Law 104-294> and 
reflected America’s geo-science and technology strategy in the cutting-edge world of genetic 
engineering while at the same time represented an attempt by the U.S. to simultaneously protect 
its geopolitical and geo-economic interests through strict export controls on what it considered 
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future bioweapons technology as well as future technology for the development of a cure for 
Alzheimer’s disease. 
In 1992, the classified Defense Department document known as “NORFAN” came to light 
which focused on the prevention of another superpower arising in Europe or Asia to replace the 
former Soviet Union, even if this involved preventing foreign researchers from U.S.allies from 
having access to American nuclear technology or basic research results.36
This was how strong America’s alarm had grown during the late Cold War era over the 
enervation of America’s DTIB. Strategic trade policy arose as an idea and became a trade 
and industry policy keyword during the 1990s, framing the strong alarm which has been 
prevalent since the Regan era. Laura Tyson, Director of the National Economic Council (NEC) 
established in the White House at the start of the Clinton administration with the primary aim 
of strengthening industrial competitiveness, was the representative of America’s strategic trade 
policy theory and helped the Clinton administration to foster a strategic trade policy that justified 
a geo-scientific and technological orientation on similar grounds to geo-economics, incorporating 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) into trade policy and developing American technological 
protectionism in multilateral (GATT Uruguay Round (and the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
since 1995)) and bilateral negotiations between Japan and the U.S.37
Furthermore, the Clinton administration established the National Science and Technology 
Council in order to create a policy plan for the systematic use of scientific and technological 
results in national security. This council issued the National Security Science and Technology 
Strategy in 1995, recommending the promotion of science and technology policies which seek 
to strategically tie science and technology to national security and emphasizing the urgency of 
incorporating scientific and technological activities into geo-strategy. In this regard the report 
well emphasized the necessity and priority of (1) maintaining a military advantage, (2) pursuing 
arms control and nonproliferation, (3) addressing the global threat of environmental deterioration 
and (4) investing financial and human resources into strengthening economic security.38 
Needless to say, the administration of George W. Bush continued the science and 
technology policies of the Clinton administration. The promotion of the ECHELON system and 
the attendant friction with the EU also fit within the framework of this discussion. Depending 
upon the issue in question, the Clinton administration would abandon the results of the 
multilateralism which served as the core of its diplomatic and national security strategy in favor 
of unilateralism, thereby increasing tension between the U.S.and the rest of the world. This 
open pursuit of the Bush administration’s geo-strategy was made abundantly clear through 
such decisions as the failure to seek ratification in Congress of arms control agreements results 
in the form of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol to fight global warming, and pursuit of a 
missile defense plan over the objection of Russia. When one looks at these actions, particularly 
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the unilateralism of Bush’s first term, it is not too much to say that they suggest a return to 
Burnham’s geopolitics. 
This change in America’s geo-strategic perception is deeply related to the sea-change 
in international alignment which occurred during the period of shifting international order 
between the late Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Following his assumption of Communist 
Party leadership in the Soviet Union in March 1985, Mikhail S. Gorbachev began a program 
of Perestroika (reform) which included sweeping changes in the internal economic and social 
systems (Glasnost) and a major shift in Soviet diplomatic and security policy; these changes 
transformed the Western world’s perception of the Soviet Union.39 The doctrines of “new 
thinking” in diplomacy and “reasonable sufficiency” in military security policy showed goodwill 
towards the West, and in response, even the Regan administration, which had called the Soviet 
Union an “evil empire” and had pursued a policy of enhanced military competitiveness against 
it, changed its stance enough to sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) on 
December 8, 1987. This catalyzed a revolution in Eastern Europe in 1989, and on December 3 of 
the same year at the U.S.-Soviet Malta Summit the Cold War was officially declared over. This led 
in 1991 to the Soviet Union itself collapsing.
The “rogue state containment” strategy was continued by the Clinton administration and, 
following the simultaneous bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, added to it the 
“containment” of Al Qaeda-like terrorist groups. With the end of the Cold War, the role played 
by CoCom in economically “containing” communist bloc ended; thus, CoCom was dissolved in 
March 1994, and a new structural linkage system between arms control and export control was 
established in conjunction with the change in America’s geo-strategy.
4. Transformation of Geopolitics in the Post-Post-Cold War Era
In a sense, the 9/11 terrorist attacks transformed American geopolitics. And to a 
considerable degree, the international community shared in this transformation. The “War on 
Terror” announced by the Bush administration partially revised America’s geo-strategy to make 
the vigorous prosecution of antiterrorism a national objective. As Samuel P. Huntington’s book 
Clash of Civilizations 40 described the possible pattern of conflict as interreligious and ethnic 
wars, it became the new post-Cold War paradigm faced not only by the U.S. but also by the 
international community at large. In the early 1990s the international community was rocked by 
the Bosnian War, the trans-border ethnic war between the Hutus and Tutsis in Africa, the Kosovo 
War, the Chechen War and other conflicts which seemed to fit with Huntington’s predictions. The 
9/11 attacks occurred amidst a proliferation of such wars.
The meaning of the 9/11 attacks have been debated from a variety of perspectives; 
however, looking at it in terms of security, the crashing of a civilian airliner – the essence of 
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modern aviation technology – into New York’s World Trade Center buildings – embodying 
modern construction technology – presented the world with a major paradox of scientific and 
technological revolution. In the blink of an eye the IT revolution had spread the invisible network 
of the Internet throughout the world, and it was this network which the terrorist groups had used 
to foment the attack. This paradox shows that non-state actors were forward-looking about the 
revolution in military affairs (RMA) which state actors had developed, recognizing the potential 
for spin-off technologies, such as a passenger jet, from military aviation technology to be used 
as a weapon. The military application of civilian technology is known as “spin-on”, and the 9/11 
attacks occurred within the RMA, where there is a mixture of spin-on and spin-off technologies; 
the attacks show that humanity now lives in the RMT (Revolution in Military Technology) age 
from which it cannot go back.41 At the same time, from a geopolitical perspective the 9/11 attacks 
diminished the role of distance in security considerations as well as the significance of drawing 
distinctions between foreign and domestic in discussions of politics, the economy and society.42 In 
other words, 9/11 showed that the international community had become smaller, revealing one 
of the effects of globalization.
Thus, in addition to the Clinton administration’s emphasis on containing “rogue states”, 
after 9/11 America also made the containment and destruction of “rogue groups” one of its core 
national goals. On the one hand, “rogue states” were labeled as being part of an “axis of evil” 
(stated in the January 2002 Presidential State of the Union Address), while on the other hand the 
U.S. was implementing a strategy to take down extremist groups like Al Qaeda and its leader the 
late Osama bin Laden through a strengthened international security regimes modeled after an 
American strategic scenario. This aspect could be seen through the expansion of the post-Cold 
War linkage system between arms control and export control, already in place during the Clinton 
years in the mid-1990s and functioning as a regulatory regime for controlling the transfer to “rouge 
states” of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the materials and technologies needed for 
their manufacture, to the inclusion of proliferation to nonstate actors as well. 
The strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, established as a nuclear arms 
control system to complement the implicit regime of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) 
which existed between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. during the Cold War, the establishment of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as its backing regime, the establishment of the Australia Group 
as a backing regime for the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention, and the establishment 
of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the post-CoCom dissolution Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 
reflects the fierce determination of the Bush administration to contain and take down “rogue 
states” and “rogue groups”.43 At the same time the ideas of “trade security” and “industrial 
security” begun under the Regan administration continue to be fundamentally conjoined and play 
an incredibly fundamental role underlying global military security.
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The logic behind the “axis of evil” label resembles that used by President Regan in 
labeling the Soviet Union an “evil empire” and can be seen as part of a cycle reviving Burnham’s 
geopolitical view. This assumption can be made based on the strengthening of the neo-
conservatives within the central government during George W. Bush’s first term, where foreign 
diplomacy and security were colored by the ideology of neo-conservative thinkers, sparking 
a cultural furor amongst the media and talking classes. Thus the policies of Bush’s first term 
which targeted “rouge states” and terrorist groups drew in friends and allies according to a neo-
conservative scenario. Examples of this are the Container Security Initiative (CSI) begun in 
January 2002 and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by President Bush on May 
31, 2003 in Poland; these centerpieces of the “rogue state” countermeasures developed by neo-
conservative Undersecretary of State John Bolton drew on the participation of many different 
nations, including Japan.
After all, it is clear that the pillar of America’s post-9/11 strategy is the stabilization of the 
rimland, and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and other American policymakers have called 
the rimland area from the Middle East to Central Asia and including South Asia, Southeast Asia 
and Northeast Asia an “arc of instability”, indicating that this area is the focus of a “forward 
deployment strategy”.44 Furthermore, with the high priority America has put on the prosecution 
of the “War on Terror”, it is not only investing its military strength in the stabilization of the 
rimland but also strengthening its geo-economic involvement in the Caspian Sea region. 
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are similar in that they started as part of the War on 
Terror; however, they also share a connection in the postwar acquisition of petroleum resources 
and related technologies. At first glance, Afghanistan looks to have no connection to petroleum 
resources. But geographically, Afghanistan is located in a strategically important location 
connecting the Heartland of Central Asia with the second rimland of the Middle East. It is evident 
what strategic significance is involved in statements about “geopolitical risk” made at G7 and G8 
summits in recent years and how they are tied to the Afghanistan situation.
The issue of petroleum development along the Caspian Sea is strongly linked to the 
resolution of the Afghan and Iraq wars and is the starkest example of geo-strategic interactions. 
After the countries of Central Asia gained their independence following the dissolution of the 
Soviet empire, the geo-strategic importance of Eurasia skyrocketed. The Caspian Sea adjoins the 
Heartland and is a treasure trove of resources. However, the U.S. was firmly opposed to Japan’s 
acquisition of drilling rights at the Azadegan oil field in Iran. Why did the U.S. not relent in its 
hard-line stance? What was the geo-strategic intention of this stance?
After negotiations with the Iranian government, Japan’s INPEX Corporation secured 
development rights to the Azadegan oil field. After negotiations with Saudi Arabia over continuing 
rights to the Khafji oil field became bogged down, the Japanese government began to search 
frantically for a new location for petroleum development; thus, this agreement over the Azadegan 
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oil field had monumental significance to Japan in terms of its energy security. The amount of 
recoverable reserves from the Azadegan oil field is estimated at more than 26 billion barrels. 
It is fair to say that this agreement represented a geo-economic wedge in the Middle East by 
resource-free Japan. The lesson Japan learned from the first oil crisis was the importance of 
diversifying its energy supplies, and it increased its dependence on nuclear power to a level 
higher than any other advanced nation. However, even today Japan’s industry remains vulnerable 
through its unbreakable dependence on petroleum resources. Grappling with this fact has been 
a grand project of Japanese economic statecraft, as it holds the key to mid and long-term security. 
Thus, we can infer the tremendous strategic interest concluding these negotiations over the 
Azadegan oil field held for Japan in terms of its economic and energy security.
The U.S. however, was fiercely opposed to this deal and both the executive and legislative 
branches were unanimous in their demand for Japan to reconsider. The official reason for 
America’s opposition was that it amounted to collaboration with Iran, a designated “rogue state”; 
the same reason was given for America’s threat of economic sanctions against French companies 
and other companies for their oil exploration agreements in Iranian-controlled territory along the 
Caspian Sea. This was an application of America’s “containment” strategy aimed at Iran that had 
begun under Clinton; and with Bush’s pronouncement of the “axis of evil” doctrine as well as the 
continuing policy of containment by the Obama administration, this strategy was strengthened 
even further, clearly applying the policy structure of the neo-conservative security view. Japan’s 
posture of economic appeasement with regard to the issue of the development of the Azadegan 
oil field definitively shows the contradictory behavior involved in America’s post-Cold War 
geopolitical strategy which places the utmost importance on the “containment” of “rogue states”.
At the same time, the shadow of America’s energy strategy looms over the actions of 
developed nations with regard to the petroleum and natural gas resources of the Caspian Sea 
region and its environs. American sanctions against the French company Total for its acquisition 
of development rights for Caspian Sea oil fields and American attempts to derail Japan’s plans 
for development of the Azadegan oil field can be read as attempts by the U.S. to use geopolitical 
restraining actions to forestall Japanese and European development while implementing a geo-
economic strategy to give American oil companies a chance to catch up. Here we can hear the 
beating heart of America’s geo-strategy for Eurasia. The massive yet dormant resources and 
markets of Eurasia as the Heartland represent the playing field for the start of a new power 
game. 
This power game involves Russia. The eastward expansion of NATO and the EU after the 
fall of the Soviet Union appears to the Russians to be bringing chaos to the cosmos built during 
the Soviet era and appears to be a harbinger of a new “iron curtain”; thus, Russia sees this as 
a threat to its geo-strategic interests and has led a push towards the western Caspian Sea and 
its environs.45 As epitomized by the progress in nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran, a 
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Moscow-Tehran axis has been created which serves as a major impediment to America’s Iranian 
“containment” strategy and WMD non-proliferation strategy. Russia’s formation of an axis with 
Iran is undergird by geo-economic motivations and reveals a shared interest in obtaining a 
strategic advantage from resource supply via a petroleum and natural gas alliance.46 The problem 
this then presents for America is, rather than the “arc of the unstable” spoken of by President 
Bush, it would be more accurate to describe it as the “cross of the unstable”. After the fall of the 
Soviet empire, the countries in the Caspian Sea region of Central Asia gained their independence 
one after another, with the majority of these belonging to the Islamic world. And one of the 
regions that did remain part of the Russian empery was the Republic of Chechnya, whose Islamic 
inhabitants sought independence from Russia, leading to armed conflict. This conflict lasted more 
than 10 years from the Yeltsin administration through the Putin administration, and continues to 
be supremely unstable, threatening to flare up at any moment.
What is more, the movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to break away from the 
Republic of Georgia led to Russian military intervention in August 2008, stoking military and 
political tensions with NATO countries. The Russian interior west of the Ural Mountains is home 
to other sources of potential conflict, including separatist movements in Dagestan and efforts 
by the Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO. The effort by the Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO 
has provoked a sense of being under siege within Russia and has invited a sense of insecurity. 
Furthermore, the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 was the result of Russia’s 
growing sense of insecurity just after the harsh conflict and violence in Ukraine in early 2014. 
Russia’s threats to cut off natural gas and oil supplies to the Ukraine between 2006 and 2014 was 
nothing other than an expression of this insecurity. For Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia are 
geopolitically important countries due to their position as crossroads between East and West and 
North and South, i.e., they are “bridge states” joining the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, 
Moldova) nations with Uzbekistan with NATO.47 Thus, with Georgia currently indicating its 
desire to join NATO, it is easy to understand why Russia is so obsessed and sensitive about this 
region.
In addition, from the Near East to the African continent, there are numerous countries 
currently facing extreme instability, such as Sudan and Kenya with their ethnic conflicts; 
Zimbabwe, which has been called an “outpost of tyranny”48 by the U.S.; and Somalia, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique and South Africa, which have seen ongoing conflict since the 1990s.
So, the regions of instability are not limited only to America’s perceived “horizontal line” 
of the rimland but also include a “vertical line” which incorporates the area west of the Ural 
Mountains to the Caspian Sea region and from the Near East straight through the African 
continent. With the Near East as the point of intersection, the regions of instability can be 
represented as a cross-like configuration.
Why does America minimize or even ignore this ver tical line? Why do American 
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policymakers, fixated on classical geopolitical thinking, not mention this vertical line? It is a 
mystery of sorts, but we can see the answer when we notice that the wave of fundamentalist 
Islamic terrorism post-9/11 has been concentrated in the horizontal line of the rimland, 
stretching through Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines. It is traversed by a 
continuous line of instability that represents a kind of “religious geopolitics”.49 The rehabilitation 
of the Taliban accompanying the lengthening of the Afghanistan War has stimulated the terrorist 
activity of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Southeast Asia, demonstrating and amoeba-like “talibanization” 
within the region.50 What is more, these conflicts are not limited to religious factors but also 
involve ethnic and tribal factors. This trend is particularly evident in Africa.
Africa is a dormant treasure trove of resources. As the example of China openly giving 
aid to Sudan (which is rocked by ethnic conflict) shows, there has been a strikingly active 
push in resource diplomacy in recent years. China’s policies towards Africa have involved a 
growing competition with America to invest in the continent; they incorporate trading practices 
reminiscent of a revived colonial trading structure, where primary commodities are imported 
and finished products are exported, and offer strengthened aid to totalitarian nations like Sudan. 
From this we see China’s geo-economic strategy in motion, and regardless of whether it represents 
the birth of a unique Chinese soft power in Africa, it risks the danger of fueling further conflict.51
Furthermore, as we examined in the previous section, America’s sense of threat vis-à-vis 
Japan in the early 1990s switched almost overnight to a fear of China as a security threat, a fear 
which exists still today. Certainly the Clinton administration promoted a policy of constructive 
engagement towards China, encouraging them to act responsibly within the international 
community. However, since the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during 
the Kosovo War in 1999, a mistrust and wariness of China has reared its head in the U.S.. This 
incident was preceded by the test firing in 1996 of missiles by China across the Taiwan Strait, 
resulting in the hurried dispatch of the U.S. 7th Fleet to the area and heightening of tensions, 
and in the same year Taiwanese-American researcher Wen Ho Lee was prosecuted for funneling 
technical information to China about warheads for submarine-launched ballistic missiles.52 
The overlapping succession of such incidents contributed to the heightening of American 
suspicions regarding China.53 In addition, China’s successful test firing in August 1999 of its 
DF31 intercontinental ballistic missile also enflamed the American sense of threat regarding 
China, while the flooding of American markets with Chinese-made light industry products has 
also enhanced mistrust of China. In addition, Chinese aggressive attitude in the South China Sea 
for building artificial islands and constructing air-fields both for military and civilian purposes 
has raised much suspicion on the part of the Obama administration about Chinese territorial 
expansionism in the area.
Thus, international geo-strategic interactions at the start of the 21st century incorporate a 
Russia and China accelerating down the path to a market economy and interweave a complex 
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structure of geo-economic and geo-scientific & technological thinking based in classical 
geopolitical awareness. There is no doubt that the power elite of the dif ferent nations will 
continue to fall under the spell of geo-strategic thinking as an offshoot of the realist philosophy 
as they pursue “statecraft”. However, this sort of geo-strategic interaction is not limited solely to 
the production of plus-sum positive consequences amongst nations. As countries stand facing the 
reality of the post-post-Cold War era, a dilemma of choice awaits. It is a major challenge to the 
security policy of not only advanced, industrialized nations but also developing nations as well.
5.  Critical Geopolitics and a Revision of Classical Geopolitics: Effect of 
Environmental Geopolitics and the “Human Security” Doctrine 
Following World War II there was a rising wave of decolonization which saw a succession 
of countries gain their independence; however, many developing nations and regions were 
unable to throw off the yoke of dependency which kept them subordinate to their former colonial 
empires. Thus, against a backdrop of resource nationalism which emerged after the Fourth 
Middle East War in 1973, a dynamic of conflict and cooperation appeared which revolved around 
the distribution of wealth amongst developed nations. For developed nations, the series of 
compromises made with countries in the South were unavoidable from the standpoint of security, 
and the adoption of a resolution at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly in 
1974 dealing with resources which granted the demands of third world countries for permanent 
sovereignty over their natural resources was an example of this thinking. And, naturally, amidst 
the rush of decolonization a geopolitics opposed to classical geopolitics arose which had a strong 
impact on developing regions.54  If the factors causing instability and tension in international 
security grow and tensions between North and South cannot be eliminated, it will not only foster 
breeding grounds for terrorism but also create increased military threats and impose a heavy 
load on security as a whole.
On this point, the political economic modifications of geopolitics as a representative Modern 
World-System theory that have occurred since the 1970s require our attention. This attempt 
at an intellectual effort to tear down the classical nature of geopolitics undergirding traditional 
realist thinking had the effect of opening new philosophical horizons in the study of international 
relations. The Modern World-System theory advanced by Immanuel Wallerstein saw the world 
economy to be an integrated economic system on a global scale. This view contrasted with 
the traditional economic interpretation of the world economy as a competitive relationship 
amongst national economies by reinterpreting global rivalry relationships as revolving around 
the relationship between northern countries and southern countries; the advanced capitalist 
regions of the North are designated as the “Center” (C) while the developing regions of the 
South are designated as the “Periphery” (P), and the rivalry on this C-P axis is the primary cause 
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of international conflict. This interpretation brought about a revolutionary transformation in 
geopolitical research based in traditional geographical interpretations.55
Wallerstein himself applied the “Kondratiev wave” theory of long-term business cycles 
in revising his theory, proposing not a C-P two-layer structure for the world capitalist system 
but a three-layer structure with a “Semi-periphery” between C and P. This concept garnered 
attention for its ability to explain Japan’s postwar trajectory from economic recovery to rapid 
growth as well as the rise of newly industrializing economies (NIES) in Asia. Thus, Wallerstein’s 
interpretation, which sees the world economy as a global system, has found broad acceptance 
as a system of thinking with the explanatory power to deal with the gaps that existing social 
sciences are ineffective at closing, namely the environmental destruction and growing social 
contradictions produced by the unequal development within the capitalist world.
For example, British geographer Peter J. Taylor has combined Wallerstein’s interpretation 
with the hegemonic cycle theory56 of George Modelski (which incorporates “Kondratiev waves”) 
and found that the theorized variation in power distribution responding to global economic 
cycles does in fact occur.57 This trend towards ideologically reconstructing geopolitics from 
the perspective of a Modern World-System theory seeks to overcome the defects of realist 
international politics which has lost its direction in the chaos of the post-Cold War era and shows 
no sign of enervation as an area of geopolitical research.
Furthermore, attention needs to be paid to those efforts to reframe geopolitics ecologically 
as well as to reconstruct it sociologically. This trend is particularly remarkable in France. Yves 
La Coste, the founder and editor of the journal “Hérodite” began in 1976 as a research journal 
for French geopolitical and geographic researchers, has advocated the necessity of synthesizing 
geopolitics with ecology to create a “new” environmental geopolitics. La Coste inherited the ideas 
of Pierre George, an activist geographer of the 1950s, and emphasized the supreme importance 
of protecting the ecosystem from the wasting of resources by the state, and in place of classical 
geopolitics, which focuses on the environmental dynamics of the geographical expansion or 
contraction of the state, La Coste sought to encourage a move towards the global management of 
land and water resources.
The logical basis for this approach was the sense of crisis underlying the endless repetition 
of a negative cycle of impoverishment and resource wasting in developing regions. This sense of 
crisis is well expressed in his books, L’eau dans le monde: les batailles pour la vie .58 Through this 
book, La Coste sought to inject geography with ideas, imagination and a sense of collectiveness 
and to analyze social phenomena, which are always attached to some political context, from the 
perspective of political sociology. His ideological interest was in using geopolitical terminology 
to examine the causal relationship between the environment and poverty, and this was clearly 
geared towards the democratization and the ecological and sociological reconstruction of 
classical geopolitics; in a sense, it aimed to radically realign geopolitics.59 At this point it is 
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possible for us to understand the impact of the humanistic phenomenology, which has been 
prevalent in the intellectual environment of France from the late Cold War period to the present, 
on the philosophical ideas of geopolitics. It dovetails with the globally shared sense of crisis about 
environmental contamination which has grown since the 1970s and created a strengthening trend 
towards viewing environmental preservation as a global security issue which transcends borders.
Furthermore, La Coste intertwined religious elements with geopolitics, enquiring into the 
security significance of the broad sweep of the transnational Islamic world. He looked at the 
11,000km from East to West, paying particular attention to the 5,000km from Indonesian Java 
to Kazakhstan and the 15 million Muslims living in China, and considered the conflict between 
the historical artifact of “core islams” and “peripheral islams”, predicting such developments as 
the Muslims under the domination of the Soviet Union becoming a subordinate minority, the 
promotion of “talibanization”, and the resistance of the Central Asian Islamic world to Soviet 
domination.60 Why were America’s struggles in the Afghan and Iraq wars after 9/11 inevitable? 
Why has the “talibanization” of South Asia and Southeast Asia accelerated? We find the issues 
raised by La Coste’s geopolitics to be useful in considering the international security issue of 
terrorism and the essential elements of “human security”.61
Thus, since the first birth cries of this effort at geopolitical reconstruction from an economic 
and sociological perspective, it has stripped off the veneer of classical geopolitical realism and 
widened the gap between itself and traditional theories of international relations. This endeavor 
by Taylor and La Coste can be seen as creating a critical theory of geopolitics which resonates 
with the new theoretical paradigm of international relations underlying environmental ethics 
theory, feminist theory and other critical theories of neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism 
which have appeared in the realm of international relations theory since the 1990s. Certainly, 
the two ideologies of neo-liberal democracy and the universal utility of market economies which 
have been promoted by the new American “empire” under the name of “globalism” since the end 
of the Cold War are attempting to wash away these critical theories; however, “new war” like that 
seen in the War on Terror proves that these critical theories still have vitality.
Critical geopolitical research stands in opposition to classical geopolitics which overlaps 
with realist international politics. Critical geopolitics considers the significance of current 
political change while critically reevaluating classical geopolitics. A major example of this would 
be the work of Patrick O’Sullivan62 and Gearóid Ó Tuathail in critically reassessing the Cold War 
geopolitical domino theory which served as the justification for the Vietnam War.63 Even outside 
the area of political geography, the works of E. P. Thompson, who was a leader of the anti-nuclear 
peace movement in Europe during the latter part of the Cold War, Czechoslovakia’s Vaclav Havel, 
who helped lead the push for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, and Poland’s George 
Konrad had the effect of making critical geopolitics resonate by providing the momentum to 
spur transnational civil society movements against nuclear development and the suppression of 
38
National Security Policy and Contemporary Geopolitics
democracy.
At any rate, both “human security”, which arose as a new security concern in light of the 
changed post-Cold War international structure, and environmental security are clearly issue 
areas in international public policy that have arisen as a result of the affinity of critical geopolitics 
and environmental geopolitics, which continue to chip away at the persistent idea of the classical 
geopolitical nation state. Ironically, the times have forced classical geopolitics, which made no 
attempt to incorporate critical geopolitics and environmental geopolitics, to incorporate their 
theses, and while this incorporation may still only be partial, it continues in earnest. Wallerstein 
points to the EU’s competence shown during the August 2008 invasion of Georgia by Russia, 
America’s struggles in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the loss of confidence by the Pakistani 
military in their clean-up operation against the Taliban in Pakistan and other examples as 
representing the end of the first phase of the new geopolitical world order and showing that a 
fusion of geopolitical views is taking place.64 
Conclusion
Whether national or international security policy, the core issue from the standpoint of 
policymaking with the “geopolitics of peace” is, when incorporating geopolitics into public policy 
on security, what amount of financial resources and human resources can be shifted to the 
maintenance of the ecosystem (which is rapidly increasing in importance in terms of security) 
and to nontraditional security areas, and how can the public be convinced of the rightness of 
this shift. The individual issue areas examined by the “geopolitics of peace”, such as terrorism, 
nontraditional security, the growing global social disparity accompanying the worldwide 
adoption of the market economy system, the wavering of the neoliberal ideological artifact of 
financial security, “human security” on the individual level, and on and on are far larger and 
weightier than can be addressed through the framework of classical geopolitics. In other words, 
classical geopolitics, which adopts a state-centered paradigm and can be considered a traditional 
“geopolitics of war”, is being forced to reorient itself in a theoretical and practical direction 
incorporating a transnational paradigm.
Following the Cold War, the international community experienced numerous bloody ethnic 
conflicts, such as the Bosnian War, the Rwandan conflict and the Kosovo War, and with the aim 
of rethinking the concept of security as the world moved into the 21st century, the United Nations 
hosted the Millennium Summit in September 2000, which affirmed the goal of realizing an ideal 
of “human security” and formed an independent commission co-chaired by Amartya Sen and 
Sadako Ogata. The report compiled by this commission hewed to an ideal of achieving “freedom 
from poverty” and “freedom from fear” irrespective of national boundaries for security in the 
global community of the 21st century.
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However, in contrast with these lofty ideals, ethnic conflicts within developing regions 
concentrated in the “cross of instability” continue unabated, injuring and killing scores of people. 
People in developing regions are exposed to unsanitary conditions and have no access to medical 
care and pharmaceuticals and live in fear from poverty and death. The post conflict strategies 
adopted have various flaws and do not provide for postwar recovery and stability, leaving the 
stage set for a reoccurrence of conflict. The post-Cold War world is faced with a new question 
which seeks to find the ideological difference between the “just war” and the “just peace; and 
the international community is tasked with the solemn duty of engaging in the intellectual 
effort required to find the answer to this question from the ongoing wars in Iraq, Syria and 
Afghanistan.65
The result of 9/11 is that we have been thrust into an era where weight needs to be given 
to both traditional state-centric security, which revolves around military force, and environmental 
and human security, which revolves around non-military means. If we do not focus on both state 
security and environmental and human security, national society itself will be subject to the 
“boomerang effect”. It is crucial that we understand how overemphasis on one security or the 
other in a drastically changing security environment will lead to an improper balance of goals and 
means, opening society up to the “boomerang effect”.66
Counterterrorism is the largest issue in international security and has a strong connection 
with “human security”. At the same time, another pressing security issue is the transnational 
collaboration needed to deal boldly with climate change and build low-carbon societies. Nearly 
all policymakers recognize global warming as a threat to what we would consider the traditional 
foundations of security. Expansion of conflict and regional destabilization as a result of water 
shortages and decreased arable land is a fact in Africa. It is predicted that global warming will 
produce millions of “environmental refugees”, and the combination of refugee migration with 
the loss of coastal areas due to rising seas will produce local conflicts leading to an increase in 
international area conflicts; thus it is imperative that we address the issue of conflict prevention. 
This is an excellent example of an issue in “human security”. And in that sense, the many 
statements adopted at the COP 21 held at Paris in 2015 well demonstrate the realization that a 
recalibration of traditional geopolitics is unavoidable.
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